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CLIMATE CHANGE: DISAPPEARING STATES,
MIGRATION, AND CHALLENGES FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW *
Sumudu Atapattu**
“There is now little doubt that humans will be forced to adapt to the impacts
of a warming world. There is also little doubt that the poorest people in the
poorest countries will bear most of the burden of adapting to climate
consequences they had almost no role in creating. As the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) has explained, “[i]n the Netherlands,
people are investing in homes that can float on water. The Swiss Alpine ski
industry is investing in artificial snow-making machines,” but “[i]n the Horn
of Africa, ‘adaptation’ means that women and young girls walk further to
collect water....” 1
-Margaux J. Hall & David C. Wiess

ABSTRACT: This Article discusses two inter-related issues: the legal
implications of climate-induced migration and the phenomenon of ‘disappearing
states’ through the lens of four case studies, Kivalina, Inuit, the Maldives, and
Tuvalu. As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) recognized that the greatest single impact of climate change may be on
human migration. With sea level rise, Small Island States face the prospect of
losing their territory. The Article discusses the challenges that these two issues
pose for international law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change poses unprecedented challenges for the
international community and international law. There is
scientific consensus that climate change is unequivocal and the
human contribution to climate change is also firmly
established. 2 The consequences of climate change are far
reaching and will affect every state in the global community,
whether rich or poor, big or small, strong or weak. Yet, it is no
secret that some states and communities will experience the
adverse effects of climate change more than others.
Specifically, Small Island States, 3 low-lying cities, and poor
and indigenous communities would suffer more than others.
The legal response to date has focused primarily on
mitigation. 4 However, in this generation and the next,
adaptation will play a bigger role than mitigation as the
greenhouse gases that are already present in the atmosphere
will continue to cause adverse consequences. 5 Many forms of
adaptation exist, and people have adapted to harsh
environmental conditions for centuries. One form of

2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Basis (T.F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013) (hereinafter
IPCC)
available
at:
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.
3. The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) emerged as a loose coalition during
the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. About SIDS, UN
CONFERENCE ON SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, http://www.sidsnet.org/aboutsids (last visited June 6, 2014). They formed themselves into the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS) mainly to lobby in relation to climate change. http://aosis.org/
(last visited June 6, 2014).
4. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107; Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (hereinafter UNFCCC).
5. IPCC, supra note 2, at 27; Hall & Wiess supra note 1.
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adaptation, albeit extreme, is migration. 6 It may provide the
only option for Small Island States, which are facing
inundation caused by sea level rise.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
recognized, as early as 1990, that human migration could be
the greatest single impact of climate change. 7 Normally, people
rarely migrate solely for environmental reasons, but in the
event of inundation caused by climate change induced sea level
rise, migration (or planned relocation) may be the only option
available to the inhabitants of Small Island States.
This Article discusses the phenomenon of “disappearing
states,” climate migration, and the challenges they pose for
international law through the lens of four case studies:
Kivalina, the Inuit, the Maldives, and Tuvalu. Kivalina is a
small village in Alaska. The Inuit are an indigenous group that
spans several countries of the Arctic. Both of these
communities are situated in the Global North. The Maldives
and Tuvalu are Small Island Developing States. Both Kivalina
and the Inuit resorted to legal action to seek relief for damage
associated with climate change, 8 while Tuvalu has threatened
legal action. 9 In contrast, the Maldives has taken a policy
approach and lobbied its cause at the U.N. 10 These
communities and countries were selected to show the
indiscriminate nature of climate change and the geographical
range of its impacts; whole nation states as well as vulnerable
communities in both developing and developed countries would

6. Some argue that people resort to migration when other forms of adaptation have
failed. See, e.g., JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); see also R. McLeman & B. Smit, Migration as an
Adaptation to Climate Change, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 31 (2006).
7. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for
Policymakers, in Climate Change: The IPCC Impacts Assessment 3 (W.J. McG. Tegart
et al. eds., 1990) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4wg1-spm.pdf.
8. Michelle Kaminsky, Island Nations May Sue US over Climate Change,
LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/lawsuits-settlements/more-litigation/islandnations-may-sue-us (last visited May 19, 2014); Kalinga Seneviratne, Tiny Tuvalu
Steps up Threat to Sue Australia, U.S., INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2002,
http://www.ipsnews.net/2002/09/environment-tiny-tuvalu-steps-up-threat-to-sueaustralia-us/.
9. Id.
10. See Maldives: Climate Change Actions, MALDIVES EMBASSY TO BELGIUM AND
MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://www.maldivesmission.eu/topics/climatechange.
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be affected. This Article does not intend to underestimate the
severe impacts of climate change in other parts of the world or
on other vulnerable communities.
II.

CASE STUDIES

A.

Case Study One: Kivalina

The village of Kivalina, Alaska, with its 400 residents, is
located on the tip of a low-lying barrier island on the Chukchi
Sea, approximately eighty miles north of the Arctic Circle. 11
The residents are primarily Inupiat Eskimo and the village
has a maximum elevation of ten feet above sea level. 12
“According to the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE), environmental changes associated with global
warming have exacerbated flooding and erosion threats to
Kivalina.” 13 In 2006 the USACE concluded that the situation
in Kivalina was “dire” and the entire town must be relocated
and estimated that it would cost between $123–249 million. 14
In 2008, Kivalina filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California against
twenty oil, coal, and electric utility corporations, arguing that
these corporations bear responsibility for the adverse effects
experienced by Kivalina’s residents as a result of the large
quantities of carbon dioxide these corporations emit. 15 Kivalina
alleged a public nuisance claim under federal common law as
well as private and public nuisance claims under California
law. They also alleged the defendants committed a civil
conspiracy by knowingly misleading the public about the
science of global warming. Specifically, they alleged that the
defendants’ individual and collective greenhouse gas emissions
contribute to global warming, and were substantially
interfering with the plaintiffs’ public rights to use and enjoy
public and private property. Because the injuries are

11. Dustin Till, Threatened by Rising Seas, Native Village Seeks Lifeline in Federal
LAW.
(Mar.
26,
2008),
available
at
District
Court,
MARTEN
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20080326-village-seeks-lifeline.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Petition at 45, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No.
08-1138).
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indivisible, the plaintiffs requested that the court find the
defendants jointly and severally liable for the damages
resulting from public nuisance, conspiracy, and concerted
action. 16 The plaintiff’s argued that:
While the global warming to which defendants
contribute injures the public at large, Kivalina suffers
special injuries, different in degree and kind from
injuries to the general public. Rising temperatures
caused by global warming have affected the thickness,
extent[,] and duration of sea ice that forms along
Kivalina’s coast. Loss of sea ice, particularly land-fast
sea ice, leaves Kivalina’s coast more vulnerable to
waves, storm surges[,] and erosion. Storms now
routinely batter Kivalina and are destroying its
property to the point that those living on Kivalina must
relocate or face extermination.17
Ultimately the district court dismissed the case on several
grounds, which included the political question doctrine and
lack of standing. 18
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that federal common law of nuisance has been
displaced by the Clean Air Act and that if a cause of action is
displaced, it also displaces all remedies. 19 It noted that “the
Supreme Court has already determined that Congress has
directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary sources and has, therefore,
displaced federal common law.” 20 It further noted that the fact
that the damage occurred before the EPA acted to establish
greenhouse gas standards does not alter the analysis and
concluded that federal common law addressing domestic
greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional
action. The court was, however, mindful of Kivalina’s perilous
situation:
Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which
itself is being displaced by the rising sea. But the
solution to Kivalina’s dire circumstances must rest in

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.Cal. 2009).
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 856.
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the hands of the legislative and executive branches of
our government, not the federal common law.21
Judge Pro, concurred, noting that once federal common law
is displaced, state nuisance law becomes available unless it is
preempted by federal law. Thus, Kivalina could pursue any
remedies under state law to the extent they are not preempted.
Judge Pro further noted that Kivalina had not met the burden
of proof in this case, i.e. tracing their injuries to the
Appellees. 22 The judge pointed out that Kivalina itself has
acknowledged that there are many thousand emitters
worldwide and the greenhouse gases have been emitted for
over hundreds of years. Yet, seeking to hold these particular
defendants solely responsible may not be equitable:
It is one thing to hold that a State has standing to
pursue a statutory procedural right granted to it by
Congress in the CAA to challenge the EPA’s failure to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions which incrementally
may contribute to future global warming. . .. It is quite
another to hold that a private party has standing to
pick and choose amongst all the greenhouse gas
emitters throughout history to hold liable to millions of
dollars in damage. 23
The inhabitants of Kivalina are currently waiting to be
relocated. 24 Their condition is dire, but because there are plans
to relocate them eventually, no effort has been made to allocate
money to improve their current living conditions. 25 For
example, the inhabitants lack safe drinking water and
sanitation and continue to suffer from something they did not
contribute to. 26 One may well ask, is this just?

21. Id. at 858; see also Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations:
Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35
NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (2011).
22. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 869.
23. Id.
24. According to historic records, reference has been made to the need to relocate
Kivalina as far back as 1905. Joshua Griffin, Presentation University of Washington
Journal of Environmental Law & Policy Symposium: Climate-Migration, Local
Conditions and Law: Food Security, Land Tenure and Gender Symposium (Feb.8,
2014).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Case Study Two: The Inuit

The Inuit are a linguistic and cultural group inhabiting the
Arctic region in four countries: Russia, United States, Canada,
and Greenland. 27 They share a common culture characterized
by subsistence harvesting of food, travel on snow and ice, and
traditional knowledge of and adaptation to Arctic conditions.
Unfortunately, the consequences of climate change, which are
more pronounced in the Polar Regions than anywhere else in
the world, threaten their traditional way of life. 28 These
threats include: (a) thinner sea ice, later freezes, and earlier
and more sudden thaws; (b) unreliability of traditional
knowledge regarding safety of sea ice; (c) changes in snowfall
patterns; (d) melting of permafrost at an alarming rate; (e) loss
of sea ice, resulting in increasingly violent storms hitting the
coastline; (f) changes in precipitation and temperature
resulting in sudden spring thaws that release large amounts of
water leading to floods; and (g) weather becoming increasingly
unpredictable. 29 Moreover, increased temperatures and sun
intensity have heightened the risk of previously rare health
problems such as skin cancer, sunburns, and cataracts. Game
animals’ habits are changing and they are moving to new
locations, which pose travel problems for the Inuit people. 30
In its 2005 petition to the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference pointed out
that although the US is the largest contributor to greenhouse
gas emissions in the world,31 it has repeatedly declined to take
measures to reduce its emissions. 32 Increased greenhouse gas
concentrations due to human activity have contributed to the

27. See
Beginning
of
the
Inuit
Circumpolar
Conference,
http://inuitcircumpolar.com/section.php?ID=15 (last visited May 19, 2014).
28. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief
from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the
United States at 33, available at: http://inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/iccfiles/FINALPetitionICC.pdf. [hereinafter Inuit Petition]
29. These impacts are documented in great detail in their petition to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights filed against the United States in 2005. Id.
30. Id.
31. Since then China has overtaken the United States as the largest emitter. See
China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, NEW YORK TIMES (June 20, 2007)
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20ihtemit.1.6227564.html.
32. See Inuit Petition, supra note 28.
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changes in global temperatures. These increased temperatures
have resulted in the impacts described above which, in turn,
have led to the violation of several of the Inuit’s human rights:
right to life, health, culture, physical integrity, security, means
of subsistence, right to choose one’s residence, freedom of
movement, and inviolability of the home. Thus, the Conference
argued that the United States is in violation of human rights
and environmental obligations. It requested that the
Commission make an onsite visit to investigate the harms
suffered by the Inuit; hold a hearing; prepare a report
declaring
the
United
States
bears
internationally
responsibility for violations of rights affirmed by the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 33 and other
international law instruments; recommend that the United
States adopt mandatory measures limiting its greenhouse gas
emissions; establish and implement, in coordination with the
petitioners, a plan to protect Inuit culture and resources as
well as a plan for Inuits to better adapt to the impacts of
climate change; and provide any other relief that the
Commission considers appropriate and just. The Commission
declined to hear the petition, but did hold a hearing on climate
change and human rights. 34
The Kivalina and Inuit cases demonstrate the pitfalls of
using litigation to seek relief for damage caused by climate
change. Causation, multiple emitters, multiple sources,
standing, remedies, and even causes of action are some of the
obstacles these petitioners have to overcome. 35 On the other
hand, even if such cases fail to bring relief to the petitioners,
they may have a broader impact–such litigation gives a human
face to the problem; it brings home the fact that climate
change is already taking place and people are already
suffering. Such legal efforts also bring attention to the problem
and may even influence international negotiations and
diplomacy. 36

33. Organization of American States [OAS], Charter of the Organization of American
States art. 3(l), Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
34. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Hold Hearing on Global
Warming, EARTHJUSTICE (Feb. 6, 2007) http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2007/interamerican-commission-on-human-rights-to-hold-hearing-on-global-warming.
35. See RICHARD LORD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 23–49 (Ben Boer et al. eds., 2012).
36. See David Hunter, “The Implications of Climate Change Litigation for

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol4/iss1/3

8

Atapattu: Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and Challenges fo

2014]

C.

CLIMATE CHANGE: DISAPPEARING STATES

9

Case Study Three: The Maldives

In its submission to the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Maldives contended that
as a Small Island State, it is especially vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change. 37 Some of these impacts were
identified as sea level rise causing permanent inundation and
flooding; increases in sea and surface temperatures causing
changes to island and marine ecosystems; increases in
intensity of extreme weather events; changes in precipitation,
which can exacerbate the effects of sea-level rise; increases in
sea temperature causing damage to coral reefs and other
aquatic life; increased salinity; destruction of rainwater
storage tanks and sanitation systems; displacement of people;
and transmission of diseases. 38
Stressing that many of their protected rights could be
violated as a result of climate change, the Maldives articulated
that the international community faces a dual challenge: to
ensure that the multilateral climate change negotiations
discuss human rights considerations and that the
international human rights discourse incorporates climate
change considerations. 39
The Republic of Maldives proclaimed in its National
Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) 40 that over eighty
percent of its total land area is less than one meter above the
sea level, and forty-four percent of the population lives within
100 meters of the coastline. Consequently, “the small size,
extremely low elevation[,] and unconsolidated nature of the
International Environmental Law-Making” in Adjudicating Climate Change: State,
National, and International Approaches 357 (William Burns & Hari Osofsky eds.,
2009).
37. Submission of the Maldives to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights under Human Rights Council Re. 7/23 (Sept. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/Maldives_Submi
ssion.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. According to the UNFCCC website, “National adaptation programmes of action
(NAPAs) provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority
activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate
change – those for which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a
later stage.” National Adaptation Programmes of Action, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php (last visited June 11, 2014).
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coral islands place the people and their livelihoods at very high
risk from climate change, particularly sea level rise.” 41 The
Program states:
The scarcity of land in the Maldives, the smallness of
the islands and extreme low elevation makes retreating
inland or to higher grounds impossible. Building
setback has limited utility and beach replenishment
may only be a temporary remedy for beach loss. Unless
expensive coastal protection measures are undertaken
the human settlements face the threat of inundation.42
The NAPA also acknowledges that human pressures such as
population increase and human intervention including land
reclamation are aggravating the problem. While the NAPA
deals with diverse issues (e.g. tourism, fisheries, water
resources, food security, human health, and flood protection), 43
it fails to address the issue of relocation en masse, despite the
fact that the Prime Minister of the Maldives had on several
occasions referred to the need to buy land to relocate its
people. 44 In 2009, he even held an underwater cabinet meeting
to draw attention to the issue of climate change. 45
D.

Case Study Four: Tuvalu

In his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September
2003, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Saufatu Sopoanga, stated:
“We live in constant fear of the adverse impacts of climate
change. For a coral atoll nation, sea level rise and more severe
weather events loom as a growing threat to our entire
population. The threat is real and serious, and is of no

41. National Adaptation Program of Action, Republic of Maldives (2007), 19,
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/mdv01.pdf.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id.
44. James Burgess, Maldives Buying Land in Australia as Preparation for Mass
Migration, OILPRICE (Jan. 10, 2012, 10:43 PM) http://oilprice.com/Latest-EnergyNews/World-News/Maldives-Buying-Land-In-Australia-As-Preparation-For-MassMigration.html; Sinking Island’s Nationals Seek New Home, CNN.COM ASIA, (Nov. 11,
2008, 1:53 AM) http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/11/maldives.president/.
45. See Maldives Government Highlights the Impact of Climate Change . . . by
(Oct.
20,
2009,
8:44
AM)
Meeting
Underwater,
MAILONLINE
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1221021/Maldives-underwater-cabinetmeeting-held-highlight-impact-climate-change.html.
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difference to a slow and insidious form of terrorism against
us.” 46
Tuvalu, formerly known as the Ellice Islands, is a
Polynesian island nation located in the Pacific Ocean, midway
between Hawaii and Australia. 47 It comprises three reef
islands and six true atolls. Its population of 10,544 makes it
the third-least populous sovereign state in the world. In terms
of physical land size, Tuvalu is the fourth smallest country in
the world. 48
In its NAPA, Tuvalu refers to the need to take adaptation
measures in relation to coastal areas, water resources,
biodiversity, agriculture, human health, and natural
disasters. 49 Like the Maldives, it too does not refer to
relocation as an option, despite recognizing its vulnerability to
natural disasters:
The islands of Tuvalu rarely exceed three meters in
height. There is no high ground on the islands to escape
to during a tsunami or tidal wave. The combination of
minimal land, high population density, and no high
ground to escape to in an event of a disaster makes
Tuvalu one of the most vulnerable nations in the world
to natural hazards, especially in regards to rising sea
levels and extreme events due to climate change. 50
Tuvalu, like other Small Island States, is at the risk of total
submergence due to sea level rise associated with climate
change. Unlike developed states, its contribution to climate
change is negligible. Despite this, these small island states are
at the risk of losing everything they have, including their
territory, culture, sovereignty and the entire population.
Several years ago, Tuvalu toyed with the idea of instituting
legal action in the International Court for Justice (ICJ) against
the United States and Australia. 51 Currently, spearheaded by
Palau, Small Island States are exploring the possibility of
46. Statement by Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tuvalu, U.N.
GAOR, 58th Sess., 10th plen. mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.10 (Sept. 24, 2003).
47. Tuvalu, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuvalu (last visited May 15,
2014).
48. Id.
49. Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Program of Action (2007), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tuv01.pdf.
50. Id. at 30.
51. See Seneviratne, supra note 8.
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getting the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion
from the ICJ on the legal obligations of states in relation to
climate change. 52
Sea level rise associated with climate change and
subsequent inundation of low-lying states will not happen
overnight. We may still have a small window of opportunity to
adopt contingency plans and adaptation plans; however, the
longer we wait, the harder it will become to plan for this
eventuality. Moreover, these islands could become
uninhabitable long before they become submerged.
III. CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
Climate change will pose many challenges for international
law, some of which are demonstrated by the common strands
that run through the case studies above: loss of land (including
total submergence in some instances) and the disappearance of
entire states, and the potential mass relocation of people.
While international law has provisions on state succession, it
does not have a legal framework for dealing with complete
disappearance of a state because the world has yet to deal with
this phenomenon. 53 Associated with this reality is the issue of
relocating entire populations. What happens to the population
of a disappearing state? Where would they go? Should such
relocation be part of an organized program of migration (for
example, as part of adaptation plans under the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)) or
should this be left to the judgment of each individual? If this is
an individual decision, displaced populations may be at the
mercy of developed states that are responsible for causing the
problem in the first place. As the discussion below shows, such
displaced populations do not have any legal protection under
contemporary international law and individuals could even
face deportation for entering other countries illegally. If
relocation is to be done collectively, it will require the

52. Press Conference, U.N. News Service, Request for International Court of Justice
Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, (Feb. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2012/120203_ICJ.doc.htm.
53. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Climate Change and the Risk of
Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States, 19, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/04
(May 2011).
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cooperation of the entire international community, or, at a
minimum, regional cooperation.
Apart from the populations of Small Island States, there is
some consensus that migration of people due to consequences
of climate change will take place around the world.54 Much of
this migration is likely to be temporary and internal. 55 In some
instances, particularly in places like Africa where
international borders are rather porous, cross-border
migration is a possibility. 56 In such situations, conflicts over
scarce resources are likely to exacerbate already volatile
situations. The next section discusses the legal ramifications of
each of these situations, except internal migration, which is
not governed by international law.

54. See IPCC, supra note 2; see also Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting
a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2009).
55. See MCADAM, supra note 6 at 193.
56. Movement of people across borders associated with recent conflicts in Africa is a
good example.
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A.

The “Disappearance” of States

Under customary international law, an entity needs to
satisfy four criteria to be recognized as a “state.” These criteria
are codified in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and
Duties of States as: (a) a defined territory; (b) a permanent
population; (c) an effective government; and (d) the capacity to
enter into relations with other states. 57 While recognition by
other states is not mentioned as a criterion, it is an implicit
requirement as the capacity to enter into relations with other
states depends on whether an entity is recognized as a state or
not. Recognition tends to be a political decision.
International law does not require the territory to be of a
particular size 58 nor does it require a particular number of
people to be present to satisfy the requirement of population. 59
According to Crawford, “although a state must possess some
territory, there appears to be no rule prescribing the minimum
area of that territory.” 60 He further notes that there is no rule
requiring contiguity of the territory of the State, although
fragmentation may make independence and control difficult to
achieve. 61 Since, according to Crawford “statehood implies
exclusive control over some territory,” 62 it would seem that
territory, however small, is necessary for statehood. On the
other hand, there is a strong presumption against extinction of
states once they are firmly established so the disappearance of
territory, by itself, may not lead to a loss of sovereignty. 63
Furthermore, in the Island of Palmas case, a seminal case
on acquisition of title to territory before the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, the Arbitrator stressed that “sovereignty is the
right to exercise in regard to a portion of the globe. . .to the

57. See JAMES CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–46 (2nd
ed., 2006); Karen Knop, Statehood: Territory, People and Government, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 95 (Crawford and Kostenniemi
eds., 2012).
58. See LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 256 n. 5
(4th ed., 2001).
59. Id. at 255 n.3 (referencing “mini states”).
60. See CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 46 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 47.
62. Id. at 48.
63. Id. at 715.
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exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” 64 Thus,
by all accounts, territory plays a crucial role in relation to
statehood and sovereignty.
Importantly, territory does not mean only physical land.
Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
sovereignty extends to the territorial sea and the air space
above that as well as over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 65
By creating the EEZ, the Convention brought a large area of
the sea, which was previously part of the high seas, under the
jurisdiction of states. This was an important development with
regard to exploitation of marine resources. By losing land
territory, states may also lose their maritime territory and its
resources.
Moreover, membership in the U.N. is open to all peaceloving “states.” 66 Thus, sovereignty and statehood have
important legal ramifications. For example, Palestine fulfills
most of the criteria of statehood but is not a state; hence, it is
not a full member of the UN. 67 There are many other entities
in the international community which do not enjoy full
statehood, yet function at the international level to some
degree: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, the Holy See, the Vatican,
etc. 68 In contrast to disappearing states, these entities do have
physical territory.
What, then, is the situation if the territory disappears
altogether? With regard to Small Island States, 69 this is a real

64. Island of Palmas Case (Neth./U.S.), 2 RIAA 829, 839 (1928).
65. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
[hereinafter UNCLOS]
66. U.N. Charter, art. 4.
67. In November 2012 the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade the Palestine
from permanent observer status to a “non-member observer state,” See, Press Release,
U.N. News Service, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine
‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations, (Nov. 29, 2012), available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm. See also, John M. B.
Balouziyeh, Palestinian Statehood under International Law, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL
NEWSROOM
(JAN.
1,
2013,
9:33
PM)
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-lawblog/archive/2013/01/03/palestinian-statehood-under-international-law.aspx.
68. For further information. See CRAWFORD, supra note 57, Chapters 13 and 14.
69. According to the SIDS webpage, there are forty Small Island States, see: About
Small Island Developing States, U.N. CONFERENCE ON SMALL DEVELOPING STATES
http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=1496 (last visited May 20, 2014). Wikipedia
gives
the
number
as
fifty
two.
Small
Island
Developing
States,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Island_Developing_States.
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possibility due to creeping sea level rise associated with
climate change. Given that these islands are only a few feet
above the sea level, even a few inches rise in sea level can have
a huge impact. Although McAdam critiques the notion of
sinking islands as being sensationalistic and dramatic, she
acknowledges that these islands will become uninhabitable
due to increased severe weather events, intrusion of salt water
and lack of fresh water coupled with unsustainable
anthropogenic activities. 70 This raises two separate, yet interrelated questions: first, what is the fate of the population and
secondly, what happens to the state itself once the territory
disappears?
1.

Fate of the Population

Under the UNFCCC, developed countries have pledged to
assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change with the costs of
adaptation and direct adverse effects. 71 There is no doubt that
Small Island States fall into this category as the Preamble to
the UNFCCC addresses Small Island States specifically. 72
Article 3 also acknowledges that those states that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change
should be given full consideration. 73 Thus, it would seem that
developed countries, which are responsible for historic
emissions, have an obligation to at least provide sufficient
funds to these countries to adapt. However, in the event where
the territory is no longer habitable, does this obligation to help
adapt extend to facilitating relocation?
While relocation en masse across international borders may
not be the first option for many of the communities affected by
climate change, in relation to Small Island States this may be
the only option, if the state is to survive as a legal entity. After
all, the world is faced with an unprecedented scenario. 74 In
70. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 126.
71. UNFCCC, supra note 4, at art. 4(4).
72. Id. at pmbl. (“Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island
countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to
floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous
ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”).
73. Id. at art. 3(2).
74. See Maxine Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized
Nationhood and the Post-Climate Era, 2 CLIMATE LAW 345 (2011); Susin Park, “Climate
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fact, it is proposed here that in order to preserve nationality,
cultural identity, and territorial integrity, it may be better to
relocate populations en masse, provided that this is done in a
systematic, cooperative manner with the participation of the
population concerned as part of adaptation plans. Additionally,
it is proposed that individuals who do not wish to participate
in an en masse relocation scheme and would prefer to avail
themselves of existing labor migration opportunities should be
given that option. This way, labeling populations as “climate
migrants, refugees or displaced persons” can be avoided.
However, this would require the close cooperation of every
state, particularly those who are responsible for causing the
problem in the first place. We could extend the common but
differentiated responsibility principle 75 to cover this scenario
but this is unlikely to be politically very palatable.
What is the role of the principle of self-determination here? 76
Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights espouse this right. Those
Covenants state: “All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.” 77 Notwithstanding the significance
of this principle, its application outside the colonial/apartheid
context is subject to some debate. It evolved as a right of people
in non-self-governing territories to freely determine their
political status. Outside this context, however, its application

Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States,” Legal
and Protection Policy Research Series, UNHCR (Mary 2011) at 8 (noting that “loss of
the entire territory of a state or the exile of the entire population and government is
without precedent”).
75. The common but differentiated responsibility principle is incorporated in
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. It recognizes the disparity in the global community
and the disparate contribution to environmental problems by developed and
developing countries. The original version of Principle 7 that sought to address historic
responsibility for global environmental problems caused considerable controversy at
the Rio Conference. Despite this, the CBDR principle is specifically incorporated in the
UNFCCC and the obligations under it are based on this principle. See HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIROMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 464 (4th ed. 2011).
76. See MCADAM, supra note 6 at 147.
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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is unclear. 78 For example, it is not clear whether ethnic
minorities or other groups would qualify as “peoples” and what
the “right” to self-determination would entail. 79 It must also be
remembered that this is a collective right and not an
individual one. 80
In the context of Small Island States, one can see the
application of the right of self-determination in relation to a
decision to relocate en masse, provided, of course, a suitable
place has been offered by another state. Its application here
should be rather uncontroversial given that the entire
population is being asked whether they want to continue under
the same sovereign, retaining their nationality, but on a
different territory. Of course, problems might arise if the
population wants to make any changes or if the state that is
offering land lays down various conditions. It is not clear how
these issues will be addressed because they are unprecedented
and international law has not faced similar issues before.
While one cannot exercise the right of self-determination to
claim land from other states, 81 given that as many as forty or
more sovereign states would be affected, it is obvious that this
issue cannot be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.
2.

Fate of Sovereign States

International law does not envision a situation where states
disappear altogether; it has rules on state succession where
one entity will replace another or a new entity emerges,
through cession, unification or dissolution. 82 The international

78. As Damrosch et al. note: “The international instruments referring to a right of
self-determination of “peoples” do not make clear whether the right applies outside the
decolonization context, and if so, how to define “peoples” entitled to exercise the right.”
DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 58, at 273.
79. Id. at 269.
80. The right to self-determination is affirmed in relation to indigenous people in the
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
81. See MCADAM, supra note 6 at 16; See also Susannah Willcox, A Rising Tide: The
Implications of Climate Change Inundation for Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 9
ESSEX HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 1 (2012).
82. See CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 700–17; see also Susin Park, supra note 74, at 6
(pointing out that there have been a few cases of extinction of states which has
occurred in the context of succession: “The situation of low-lying island States would
be unique in this sense, inasmuch as there would, in principle, be no successor States
in such cases”).
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community needs to address the legal vacuum that would arise
as a result of states disappearing due to consequences
associated with climate change. 83 Over forty sovereign states
are at the risk of losing their territory. Long before their
territory disappears, however, their populations will have to be
relocated. How the international community will address this
issue would be crucial for the continuation of these states as
sovereign nations. There are no uninhabited territories lying
around—barring Antarctica84—that states can “discover” and
“occupy.” Every available territory is under the sovereignty of
a particular state. Even more worrying is the fact that Small
Island States, whose contribution to climate change is
negligible and will continue to be so, will be at the mercy of
those states that caused the problem in the first place. This
raises important questions about equity and the application of
the common but differentiated responsibility principle (CBDR).
Under the legal regime governing climate change, the CBDR
has been applied in relation to mitigation. Can we now apply it
to adaptation, at least with regard to Small Island States
whose plight is becoming increasingly precarious and who will
be at the mercy of the international community?
The question, of course, arises as to what happens if the
international community is not altruistic and does not provide
territory to allow relocation en masse. What if states are
prepared to take in citizens of Small Island States on an ad hoc
basis, but do not allow them to retain their identity for fear of
conflicts with their own citizens? In this situation, which
seems to be the most likely (and realistic) scenario, the state
could disappear when the territory disappears, along with its
territorial sea and the EEZ. The population would lose its
nationality, diplomatic protection (unless the recipient state
extends citizenship) and other rights associated with
nationality. Is this the fate of the Small Island States? If states
were willing to sell part of their land to Small Island States
that had enough purchasing power to buy such land, then
there will be a fairly smooth transition to the new location,
provided, of course, the new land could sustain their

83. Here I am referring to the physical disappearance of states—the international
community could decide that, legally, these entities will continue as ‘states.’
84. Territorial claims to Antarctica are frozen and no new claims can be made. See
Antarctic Treaty, art. v, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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traditional livelihoods, customs, etc. This will be particularly
challenging with regard to indigenous communities whose
traditional way of life is very much dependent on the land they
inhabit.
The strong presumption that favors the continuity of an
established state “suggests that acceptance of creative
interpretations of law to recognize the continued existence of a
state—particularly in this ‘unusual situation’—is plausible.” 85
If the presumption in international law is in favor of continued
statehood, then is it possible to argue that existing states
should continue even though it lacks physical territory? In
other words, can a “deterritorialized statehood” exist? 86 If
states cannot exist without physical territory, their
populations will become stateless people. 87
3.

Nations Ex-situ

Identifying these states as “endangered states,” 88 Burkett
proposes a legal fiction of “nations ex-situ” to deal with this
emerging category of states that could possibly disappear as a
result of climate change. 89 She argues that:
Ex-situ nationhood would be a status that allows for the
continued existence of a sovereign state, afforded all the
rights and benefits of sovereignty amongst the family of
nation-states, in perpetuity. It would protect the
peoples forced from their original place of being by
serving as a political entity that remains constant even
as its citizens establish residence in other states. It is a
means of conserving the existing state and holding the
resources and well-being of its citizens—in new and

85. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 354 (positing that the phenomenon of endangered
states “raises novel questions that may challenge the very foundation of Westphalian,
or nation-state, sovereignty”) (footnotes omitted).
86. Id.; see also Rosemary Rayfuse, W(h)ither Tuvalu? International Law and
Disappearing States, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FACULTY OF LAW RESEARCH
SERIES, paper 9 (2009).
87. See U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954,
360 U.N.T.S. 130 (based upon presumption against statelessness and envisaging a
situation where people become stateless due to operation of law). See also, MCADAM,
supra note 6, at 138–143.
88. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 354.
89. Id. at 345.
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disparate locations—in the care of an entity acting in
the best interest of its people. 90
She points out that in practice this would mean creating a
governmental framework that could exercise authority over a
diffuse people. Noting that others have called for the revival of
the U.N. trusteeship system 91 to administer the duties of a
deterritorialized government, Burkett proposes “a hybrid
structure that provides a permanent space for long-distance,
and perhaps collaborative, governance of Nations Ex-Situ.” 92
Thus, nation ex-situ would be a new entity which could be
based along the lines of the U.N. trusteeship system: “The
government of ex-situ nations would sit in a permanent
location and manage the affairs of the state at a distance.” 93
Other scholars have argued for an “authority” that could
continue to manage the maritime zones of the disappeared
states for the benefit of the displaced population. 94 It is not
clear whether these maritime zones would automatically
disappear if the territory that it is attached to disappears.
Common sense dictates that maritime zones would disappear
because the breadth of these zones is measured in relation to
the land territory. 95 On the other hand, it can be argued that
these zones are created by law so they will not disappear
automatically. Of course, the drafters of the Law of the Sea
Convention did not envisage this scenario when it was adopted
30 years ago.

90. Id. at 346 (borrowing from the concept of ex-situ conservation).
91. All territories under this system have now attained self-government or
independence.
See
United
Nations
Trusteeship
Council,
http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Rayfuse, supra note 86. However, current maritime zones are based on
baselines that are linked to physical territory. See Charles Di Leva & Sachiko Morita,
Maritime Rights of Coastal States and Climate Change: Should States Adapt to
Submerged Boundaries, WORLD BANK, LAW & DEVELOPMENT WORKING PAPER SERIES,
paper 5 (2007); Michael Gagain, Climate Change, Sea Level Rise, and Artificial
Islands: Saving the Maldives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims through the
‘Constitution of the Oceans,’” 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77 (2012).
95. UNCLOS, supra note 65.
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B.

Climate Migration

For centuries people have migrated for environment-related
reasons. 96 Much of such migration has been voluntary. Forced
migration and displacement is usually associated conflict.
However, we are now faced with a new category of people:
those who will be forced to migrate, whether internally or
internationally, due to climate change.97 Unfortunately,
current international law does not protect them.
International law recognizes several categories of people and
the legal protection accorded to them varies according to each
category. Climate migrants do not fit within any of these
categories.
Nationals: For purposes of international law, nationals are
those who enjoy the citizenship of that particular state. It is
nationality that links the state with the individual. This link
also triggers certain rights vis-à-vis the state, including
diplomatic protection, protection of human rights and
protection from external aggression. 98
Refugees and asylum seekers: Sometimes the national state
itself becomes the aggressor or persecutor and the
international community must step in to take the role that is
traditionally played by the state. In the case of persecution on
the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic origin or place of birth,
the individual has to seek refuge in a foreign state and if that
individual succeeds in establishing this, he/she becomes
entitled to refugee status in the receiving state. 99 This
protection is afforded by the Geneva Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. 100

96. See McLeman & Smit, supra note 6, at 31.
97. The estimates of such “climate refugees” have ranged from twenty million to twohundred million by 2020. Compare Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees: A
Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON 609–13 (2002) (two-hundred million), and David Adam,
50m Environmental Refugees by End of Decade, UN Warns, GUARDIAN (Oct 12, 2005),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/oct/12/naturaldisasters.climatechange
1 (fifty million) with HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS, CHRISTIAN AID (2007),
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/human-tide.pdf (one-hundred-and-five million).
98. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 58, at 425.
99. Those who are seeking such protection are referred to as asylum seekers and
people whose status has been decided are considered as refugees.
100. Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 2545.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol4/iss1/3

22

Atapattu: Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and Challenges fo

2014]

CLIMATE CHANGE: DISAPPEARING STATES

23

Internally displaced people: Sometimes people are displaced
internally due to conflict, natural disasters, etc., but do not
cross an international border. Such displacement is usually
temporary but in conflict situations people have been displaced
for years and sometimes multiple times.101 In this situation,
they are still subject to the protection of their national state
but since they are displaced from their home they should be
afforded some protection. The U.N. Guiding Principles of
Internal Displacement, 102 a soft law instrument, provide
guidance as to how such people should be treated.103
Migrants: Those who cross an international border but are
not fleeing persecution, civil strife, or a natural disaster are
migrants. They are generally considered as economic migrants
in search of better conditions of life. However, it is not always
easy to establish a clear demarcation between economic
migrants and others. Migration refers to the movement of
people and is a catch-all phrase to encompass everybody who
moves from his/her place of origin. Sometimes, of course,
migration is not voluntary. Even if migration seems voluntary,
when all the circumstances are taken together, migration can
be deemed forced.
As Professor McAdam points out, it is important to
conceptualize migration correctly as the legal response to
climate migration would depend on its accurate
conceptualization. 104 As the above discussion shows, the reason
why people migrate is very relevant for the applicable legal
regime. She identifies five questions that must be addressed in
this regard: (a) whether the movement is voluntary or
involuntary; (b) the nature of the trigger; (c) whether
international borders are crossed; (d) whether there are
political incentives to characterize it as climate migration; and
(e) whether movement is driven or aggravated by factors such
as discrimination. 105 Given the predicted consequences of
climate change, particularly in relation to Small Island States,
it is likely that sizeable populations will have to be relocated to
101. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: GLOBAL OVERVIEW
OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 2009 (NINA M. BIRKELAND ET AL. EDS., 2010).

102. Id. U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
103. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 101.
104. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 17.
105. Id.
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less vulnerable areas. Estimating the magnitude of the
problem is rather difficult because people rarely move solely
for environmental reasons. 106 Sea level rise, severe weather
events and desertification coupled with poverty, lack of
prospects and rising cost of living are most likely reasons to
force people to move. 107 Provided the international community
is altruistic and open about welcoming citizens from Small
Island States (other legal issues aside), problems are likely to
arise if people start migrating from heavily populated areas
such as Bangladesh due to their sheer numbers and possible
cultural and religious differences in the receiving state. While
it is likely that much of initial migration will be internal, cross
border migration will result where the state cannot cope with
internal migration or where international borders are rather
porous.
In order to decide on an appropriate legal framework, it is
useful here to base our discussion on the typology developed by
Walter Kalin, U.N. Secretary-General’s Representative on the
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, setting out the
diverse scenarios that could be encompassed within
“environmental displacement”: (a) the increase of severe
weather events (hydro-meteorological)—movement here is
likely to be internal and temporary; (b) government-initiated
planned evacuations to safer areas—movement here is likely to
be permanent and internal; (c) environmental degradation and
slow onset disasters—this may be a trigger for people to move
voluntarily; (d) Small Island States—where the land is no
longer habitable, permanent relocation to other countries
would be necessary even if the country is not yet inundated;
and (e) displacement associated with conflict over natural
resources—resource-based conflicts can be particularly
challenging and where scarcity cannot be resolved, conflicts
and displacement can be protracted. 108 If one were to adopt
this typology, the critical area for the purposes of international
law would be scenario (d) above. However, movement across
international borders associated with (c) and (e) above cannot
be ruled out.
106. See Sheila C. McAnaney, Sinking Islands? Formulating a Realistic Solution to
Climate Change Displacement, 87 NYU L. REV. 1172, 1180–81 (2012).
107. See THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS 7 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier
eds., 2013).
108. Id. at 19.
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Most migration will be internal, temporary and gradual. 109
Migration en masse in the face of a disaster would be
temporary even where an international border is crossed. It
has been argued that it is not necessary to devise a legal
regime governing “climate migrants” as existing labor
migration schemes will be sufficient to cover them. 110 This
argument unfortunately ignores the plight of Small Island
States and the fact that these populations will have to be
relocated en mass at some point.
As has been repeated often in scholarly writings, the current
international legal regime covers only political refugees. 111 The
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines
a refugee as a person who:
[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection
of that country. . . . 112
Despite arguments to the contrary, 113 by no stretch of
imagination can this be interpreted as encompassing those
109. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 16 and McAnaney, supra note 106.
110. See MCADAM, supra note 6.
111. The subject of environmental/climate refugees has attracted considerable
literature. See generally, Myers, supra note 97; Dana Zartner Falstrom, Stemming the
Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and
Preserve the Environment, 13 COLO. J. INT’L. ENVTL. & POL’Y 1 (2001); Brooke Havard,
Seeking Protection: Recognition of Environmentally Displaced Persons under
International Human Rights Law, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 65 (2007); MOLLY CONISBEE &
ANDREW SIMMS, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: THE CASE FOR RECOGNITION (David
Nicholson-Lord ed. 2003); Suzette Brooks Masters, Environmentally Induced
Migration: Beyond a Culture of Reaction, 14 GEO. IMMGR. L. J. 855 (2000); Tamer Afifi
and Koko Warner, The Impact of Environmental Degradation on Migration Flows
Across Countries, U.N. UNIVERSITY, paper 5 (2008); Jane McAdam, Environmental
Migration Governance, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FACULTY OF LAW RESEARCH
SERIES, paper 1 (2009); CAMILLO BOANO, FMO RESEARCH GUIDE ON CLIMATE CHANGE
AND DISPLACEMENT (2008), http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo046; Gil Marvel
Tabucanon, Migration for Environmentally Displaced Pacific Peoples: Legal Options in
the Pacific Rim, 30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 55 (2012); Aurelie Lopez, The Protection of
Environmentally-Displaced Persons in International Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 365 (2007);
Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the
Debate, (U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, New Issues in Refugee Research Paper
No. 70, 2002).
112. See Geneva Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1.
113. See Jessica Cooper, Note, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of
the Refugee Definition, 6 NYU ENVTL. L. J. 480 (1998); Falstrom, supra note 111, at 22
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who may be displaced by climate-related events or even
environmental events. Neither is it feasible to amend the
definition to cover such people. Those who advocate for
amending the Geneva Convention must take the specific
context in which it was adopted into consideration and see
whether the existing framework can be stretched to cover
another category of people unrelated to the original objective
and in a totally different context. If the international
community is serious about protecting the category of people
who will be displaced as a result of climate change, then it
makes sense to do so within the legal framework governing
climate change or adopting a separate legal regime
altogether. 114
The African Union Convention on Internally Displaced
Persons is the only international treaty that comes closest to
recognizing people displaced by climate change. 115 It defines
“internally displaced persons” as:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized State border. 116
Here again, however, the event must amount to a disaster
and the convention only covers those internally displaced.
While recognizing and providing for a category of people
called “climate refugees” (or whatever legal term is adopted)
could distract attention from the urgent need to reduce
emissions, it is important to recognize that the emissions that
are already in the atmosphere will continue to cause adverse
effects in the coming years, even if the international

(refering to scholars who argue for expanding the Geneva Convention but proposing a
separate convention).
114. See Falstrom, supra note 111 (advocating the adoption of a separate legal
regime); Docherty & Giannini, supra note 54; discussion infra Part III.C; Fabrice
Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration 34 (U.N.
University, Interdisciplinary Security Connections No. 5, 2007) (arguing against
expanding the Geneva Convention).
115. African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), Oct. 23, 2009, 49 I.L.M. 86.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
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community were to stop all emissions today. 117 Thus, for the
present generation and the next, adaptation will be more
important than mitigation. Mitigation and adaptation must go
hand in hand—with regard to mitigation, the international
community is already racing against time. Their options are
getting more and more limited and their emission reductions
will have to get more and more drastic as the window of
opportunity the international community has is getting
increasingly narrower.
Some have contested the projected numbers of displaced: 118
estimates vary from 20 million to 200 million by 2050. 119 What
is important, however, is not the exact number or the
methodology that is adopted to count climate refugees. For, it
is clear that no matter what methodology is adopted, the
numbers will be in the millions, not hundreds. Although
scholars such as McAdam have argued persuasively for
effective in situ adaptation measures, 120 they have at the same
time acknowledged that “in the absence of adaptation and
migration strategies, there could be widespread population
displacement
from Small
Island
Nations
rendered
uninhabitable as a result of climate change impacts on their
already fragile ecosystems.” 121 As Burkett points out, “Largescale migration of people and communities due to climate
change may have a dramatic effect on the globe in the next
half-century.” 122 Even assuming that movement of people for

117. See Oli Brown, Migration and Climate Change, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
MIGRATION, no. 31, at 41 (2008) (stressing need to formally acknowledge the
predicament of forced climate migrants and that a certain amount of forced migration
is “locked in”).
118. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 28 (referring to Norma Myer’s estimate of 150
million displaced by the middle of this century as emblematic of the alarmist
approach); Richard Black, Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? (U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, New Issues in Refugee Research Paper No. 34, 2001);
David Keane, The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for
the Meaning of “Environmental Refugees,” 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (2004); see
also Axel Bojanowski, Feared Migration Hasn’t Happened: U.N. Embarrassed by
Forecast on Climate Refugees SPIEGEL ONLINE, (Apr. 18, 2014, 2:52 PM)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/feared-migration-hasn-t-happened-unembarrassed-by-forecast-on-climate-refugees-a-757713.html.
119. See supra note 97.
120. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 35.
121. Id. at 119–20.
122. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 348.
FOR
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most part will be internal, temporary, and not en masse, 123 one
cannot ignore the plight of people currently living in Small
Island States who account for about 5 percent of the world’s
population. 124 If these territories become uninhabitable due to
climate change or related causes at some point in the future,
we will have to relocate these people en masse. 125 Already
there are reports of a village in Fiji being relocated as a result
of saltwater intrusion due to sea level rise. 126
How will international law deal with this situation? There
may be many existing models to look at—protectorates, leasing
of land, two forms of sovereigns existing together such as in
the case of Native Americans in the US, governments in exile,
trusteeships, etc. Legally, we may be able to come up with a
workable framework; however, the crucial issue will be finding
physical land to relocate people and set up a “state”. An ideal
scenario would be where land is sold, leased or “donated” in a
geographically similar area where people can settle down and
continue their livelihoods that they are accustomed to.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the population
could use this as an opportunity to free itself from shackles of
poverty in the country of origin and seek opportunities
elsewhere—this may mean acting individually but this is a
possibility that one cannot rule out or exclude. If individuals
want to explore opportunities elsewhere, they have the right to
do so but they may not be able to avail themselves of the
protection of their state in that situation or the state may not
be in a position to protect them anyway. As Burkett points out,
we may want to distinguish those who migrate from Small
Island States from other climate migrants for several reasons:
(a) inability to return to their homes; (b) collective migration;
(c) predictable need for migration; and (d) a unique and
123. See MCADAM, supra note 6.
124. See About the Alliance of Small Island States, http://aosis.org/about-aosis/ (last
visited May 20, 2014).
125. As Professor Burkett points out: “For small-islanders, in particular, the perils of
migration . . . is made worse by the loss of their state. In other words, while
displacement within and across borders may be a compulsory journey for many
“climate migrants,” small-islanders will be on the move absent a country — with all of
its attendant legal, economic, and cultural markers — to which to return.” Burkett,
supra note 74, at 348–49.
126. See Reports: Fiji Latest Country to Relocate Climate Refugees, ALLIANCE OF
SMALL ISLAND STATES, (Jan. 29, 2014) http://aosis.org/reports-fiji-latest-country-torelocate-climate-refugees/.
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compelling moral element to their situation. 127 However, some
of these criteria, particularly (a) and (c), may be applicable in
relation to other climate migrants too—those currently living
in low lying areas like Dhaka, Bangladesh, would be a good
example. Such people could cross the border into India giving
rise to, among other things, ethnic tensions.
C.

Proposals That Have Been Advanced

Lack of a proper definition of or a legal regime governing
environmental/climate refugees is certainly not due to a want
of scholarly debate on the subject. 128 Rather, the field is replete
with an overload of ideas and suggestions. 129 The persistent
problem has been to get the international community rallied
around the need to take action. Starting from “environmental
refugees,” a term coined by El-Hinnawi in 1995 as “those who
have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily
or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption
that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the
quality of life,” 130 controversy has surrounded both the
terminology as well as the definition. Despite the flood of
scholarly articles and books on the subject, 131 no consensus has
so far been reached on either issue.

127. Burkett, supra note 74, at 351.
128. I have explored this aspect in more detail elsewhere. Sumudu Atapattu,
Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: Implications for International
Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L. J. 607 (2009); see also, MCADAM, supra note 6, at Chapter 7.
129. Climate migration has also attracted considerable literature. See generally,
Docherty & Giannini, supra note 54; Marissa S. Knodel, Wet Feet Marching: Climate
Justice and Sustainable Development for Climate Displaced Nations in the South
Pacific, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 127 (2012); GEETANJALI GANGULY, CLIMATE CHANGE,
DISAPPEARING STATES AND FORCED HUMAN DISPLACEMENT: THE DESIRABILITY AND
MERITS OF A PROTOCOL OR CONVENTION FOR PERSONS DISPLACED BY CLIMATE CHANGE
(2011) available at http://150.203.86.5/coast/events/environment/papers/ganguly.pdf;
David Hodgkinson et al., Climate Change ‘Refugees’ and the Need for a Global
Agreement, 4 PUBLIC POLICY 155 (2009); Black, supra note 118; Elizabeth Burleson,
Climate Change Displacement to Refuge, 25 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 19 (2010); Katrina
Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 167 (2013).
130. Referred to in Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, Koko Warner,
Environmental Degradation and Migration, available at http://www.berlininstitut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/handbuch_texte/pdf_Renaud_Environmental.pdf,
who credit Lester Brown as the first proponent of environmental refugees; see also
Knodel, supra note 129.
131. See authorities cited in supra note 128.
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Proposals range from expanding the Geneva Convention on
Refugees, 132 on the one hand to adopting a separate, standalone convention on climate refugees, 133 on the other. In
between lies the proposal to adopt a protocol on climate
refugees either to the Geneva Convention or the UNFCCC
even though climate refugees do not fit neatly within either
legal regime. 134
The Draft Convention on the International Status of
Environmentally-displaced Persons (“Draft Convention”) 135
proposed by the Interdisciplinary Centre of Research on
Environmental, Planning and Urban Law is the most
elaborate effort toward such a framework. Its objective is to
establish a legal framework that guarantees the rights of
environmentally-displaced persons and to organize their
reception as well as their eventual return, in application of the
principle of solidarity. 136 Each party is to protect
environmentally displaced persons in conformity with human
rights law.
The Draft Convention defines “environmentally-displaced
persons” as “individuals, families and populations confronted
with a sudden or gradual environmental disaster that
inexorably impacts their living conditions, resulting in their
forced displacement, at the outset or throughout from their
habitual residence.” 137 A “sudden environmental disaster” is
defined as “a rapidly occurring degradation of natural and/or

132. Id.
133. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 54, at 350.
134. Id. at 50.
135. The Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-displaced
Persons
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cidce.org/pdf/Draft%20Convention%20on%20the%20International%20Stat
us%20on%20environmentally%20displaced%20persons%20%28second%20version%29.
pdf.
136. Id. at art. 1. Solidarity is an emerging principle and encompasses an amalgam
of existing principles: of cooperation, peaceful co-existence and humanitarian
assistance. According to the UN Human Rights Council, “international solidarity is not
limited to international assistance and cooperation, aid, charity or humanitarian
assistance; it is a broader concept and principle that includes sustainability in
international relations, especially international economic relations, the peaceful
coexistence of all members of the international community, equal partnerships and the
equitable sharing of benefits and burdens.” U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 18/5,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/18/L.12, (Sept. 23, 2011).
137. Id.
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human origin,”138 while a “gradual environmental disaster” is
defined as “a slow, progressive or planned degradation of
natural and/or human origin.” 139 It further defines “forced
displacement” as “any temporary or permanent displacement
made inevitable by environmental disaster, either within a
State or from the State of residence to one or more receiving
States, of individuals, families or populations.”140
According to the Draft Convention’s Article 9, all persons
confronted by a sudden or gradual environmental degradation
have the right to move within or outside of their home state.
The Article places an obligation on states not to hinder such
displacement. It is interesting to compare this right with the
right to choose one’s residence and the right not to be
displaced. 141 The draft convention further guarantees the right
to water, housing, food, healthcare, work, culture, religion and
education. It thus guarantees both civil and political rights and
economic, social, and cultural rights recognized under
international law. It provides that such displaced persons have
the right to return when their place of origin is habitable and
that they have the right to retain the nationality of the state of
origin affected by an environmental disaster. It places
obligations on the host state to facilitate their naturalization, if
requested, and to not prosecute them if they enter the host
country illegally.
This raises important issues related to migrants work status
in host countries. Usually, people who are forced to migrate
and certainly those who enter a country illegally (whatever the
reason is) are not allowed to work in the host state. While
basic humanitarian assistance is usually accorded to such
people, the right to work and education are not available. This
provision represents a derogation from this common practice
as it envisages that migrants are entitled to request
naturalization in the host state and the host state has an
obligation to facilitate it; naturalization carries with it the
right to work.

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 689 (1994).
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The draft convention embodies both positive and negative
components. The definition of environmentally displaced
persons refers to environmental disasters, whether they are
sudden or gradual. It is unlikely that sea level rise associated
with climate change amounts to an “environmental disaster.”
Moreover, the definition of a gradual degradation refers to “a
slow, progressive or planned degradation of natural and/or
human origin.” It is not clear what action or event would
amount to planned degradation of the environment. The Draft
Convention lays down an elaborate institutional framework to
implement its provisions including the establishment of a
national commission on environmental displacement in each
signatory state, a High Authority to hear appeals from the
national commission, a World Agency for EnvironmentallyDisplaced Persons (WAEP), and a conference of parties.
Parties would be required to submit national reports to the
Secretariat to be established under the proposed framework.
In addition, it envisions the establishment of a World Fund for
the Environmentally-Displaced (WFED) that would be
supported by voluntary contributions as well as a mandatory
tax based on the causes of sudden or gradual environmental
disasters that give rise to environmental displacement.
While the proponents of the draft Convention have invested
considerable time and thought in it, a closer look reveals
several flaws: not only is the definition of an environmentally
displaced person hard to implement, but the Convention would
require an enormous commitment of resources from the host
states, including provision of basic rights and needs, as well as
providing free interpreters and translators. These new
institutions would create additional costs on an already
burdened bureaucracy in many countries. All of these issues
raise the question whether there will be any political support
for the adoption of such a convention. The economic and
political stakes of ratification seem very high, particularly
since the numbers of such displaced persons could run into
thousands, if not millions. The main issue, however, is that
this framework will not cover those currently living on Small
Island States as the Draft Convention envisions the eventual
return of these displaced populations to their homes when such
return in possible. By not confining this to climate refugees,
the drafters seem to opt for a more inclusive approach.
However, it may prove to be rather unwieldy if every
environmental disaster triggers mass migration. Others have
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sought to distinguish between three categories of people: (a)
environmentally motivated migrants; (b) environmentally
forced migrants; and (c) environmental refugees. 142
Biermann and Boass, on the other hand, have proposed that
those who are displaced by climate change should be treated
differently due to their special character. 143 They define
“climate refugees” as: “people who have to leave their habitats,
immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or
gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at
least one of the three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise,
extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity.” 144
These proponents restrict the application of climate refugees
to three direct impacts of climate change: sea level rise,
extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity. 145
They also exclude four categories of impacts from a possible
definition: (i) climate impacts that have only a marginal link
with forced migration; (ii) forced migration as a result of
measures taken in relation to mitigation or adaptation; (iii)
migration due to other factors such as industrial accidents or
natural disasters unrelated to human activities; (iv) migration
due to indirect impacts of climate change such as conflicts over
natural resources. 146 Biermann and Boass’ definition thus
highlights one of the problems with defining climate
refugees—it is difficult to establish the causal link between the
event and climate change—extreme weather events such as
flooding, prolonged droughts are a good example. While there
is recognition that climate change will give rise to severe
weather events both in relation to the frequency and the
severity, 147 it is not possible to identify climate change as the
sole cause. 148 Furthermore, there is also recognition that
climate change will give rise to water and food scarcity, 149
which could lead to conflicts over these resources resulting in
142. See Renaud et al., supra note 129, at 1–9.
143. See Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boass, Preparing for a Warmer World:
Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, at 25–30 (Global
Governance Working Paper No 33, 2007).
144. Id. at 8.
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Atapattu, supra note 128.
147. See IPCC, supra note 2.
148. See Black, supra note 128, at 12–14; Lopez, supra note 103.
149. See Biermann & Boass, supra note 142, at 11.
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forced migration in some instances. It is unfortunate that,
according to this definition, such people will not fall into the
category of climate refugees and, therefore, unable to benefit
from the proposed legal framework.
IV. CONCLUSION
Climate change poses unprecedented challenges to the very
core of the international legal order, threatening the
foundations of international law. Nation-states, sovereignty
and the gamut of rights and privileges that emanate from the
notion of sovereignty will be threatened as a result of climate
change, particularly in relation to Small Island States which
are especially vulnerable to these consequences. Whatever may
be the uncertainties related to climate change and climate
migration, one thing is clear: the people of these endangered
states cannot be left to fend for themselves alone simply
because a vacuum exists in relation to their legal status. The
international community should use this as an opportunity to
design a new legal regime in relation to the various challenges
posed by climate change. The international community may
have to depart from the traditional notions of statehood,
populations, sovereignty and nationality and devise a legal
regime to govern those who will be displaced because their
territory became submerged or because they were forced to
migrate due to climate change. Whether they are called
“nations ex situ,” “endangered states,” “states in exile” or
“deterritorialized states,” a legal solution will have to be found
to accommodate their new status. 150 As Burkett points out:
Climate change takes us to a legal frontier. In other
words, novel scenarios push current legal fields to their
extensive margins, and force consideration beyond their
existing boundaries. Further, notions of consistency and
finality, like the state-territory link, are increasingly
moribund. . ..Yet, it is probable that the emerging legal
architecture for climate change will contain overlapping

150. See Michael B. Gerrad & Gregory E. Wannier, supra note 107, who point out:
“It is our moral duty as a society to prevent anthropogenic climatic change to the
extent that we can and to help these threatened nations cope with the climate change
that will occur despite our best efforts.” Of course, it is questionable whether we made
our best efforts but it is clear that these states require the help of the international
community.
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instruments, specific to the circumstances of disparate
peoples and environments. . ..The law would do well to
embrace layers and inter-linkages — that is the essence
of its successful transformation. Indeed, chasing
coherence discourages experimentation in lawmaking,
exactly what may be needed in the endangered-states
context — and what will be a core element of postclimate governance. 151
Although we may still have a window of opportunity to
work on the issue of “endangered states” and their citizens
collectively, the longer we wait, the harder it will become to
get buy-in from states to devise a legal regime. However,
considering our experience with climate change
negotiations, the outlook is not very promising. As we
continue the game of political finger pointing, can the
international community afford to sit and wait for
sovereign nations to be submerged leaving their
populations stateless, landless and resourceless? Is this the
legacy that awaits the Small Island States?

151. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 373.
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